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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16669 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, MARCELLA RAE GRIFFIN, appeals from 
her conviction of the crime of Aggravated Robbery in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable David 
B. Dee, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following trial by jury the Court entered judgment 
of guilty for the crime of Aggravated Robbery against the 
appellant, and subsequently committed appellant to the Utah 
State Prison for the term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower Court's 
conviction reversed and to have the case remanded to the 
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial, or in the 
alternative, to have the matter dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 18th day of July, 1978 the patrons of a 
beauty salon known as the House of Sherman were robbed by 
two armed gunmen who were wearing disguises. Just previous 
to the time of the robbery various police officers had been 
following the black and silver Camaro containing four persoru 
in the area of the House of Sherman. Shortly after arriving 
at that vicinity, police officers lost contact with the cu. 
Subsequently, Detective Labrum of the Salt Lake County Sherif'. 
Office relocated the car and observed Marcella Griffin come 
from the area of the House of Sherman, carrying several purses 
After contacting other law enforcement agents, Detective Labr; 
proceeded into the House of Sherman where he was confronted 
by an armed man who appeared to be black with an Afro, and 
disarmed Detective Labrum, and subsequently handcuffed him wit' 
his own handcuffs, and both robbers fled the area. Shortly 
thereafter law enforcement officers stopped the black and siW 
Camaro containing Cindy Vigil and Marcella Griffin, and locatec 
several of the purses taken in the robbery in the vehicle. 
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When Marcella Griffin was taken into custody, 
she subsequently gave police officers permission to enter 
her residence for the purpose of securing her children, and 
checking for the presence"of two suspects. Mrs. Griffin was 
taken to the police station. Police officers proceeded 
to her house and waited for some time. Subsequently, the 
defendants Shawn Henline and Dennis Griffin were apprehended 
at the home of Marcella Griffin. An athletic type bag 
containing certain evidence was seized, a second vehicle was 
lillpounded and a search of that vehicle revealed additional 
evidence later identified as having come from the robbery 
of the House of Sherman. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POLICE OFFICERS EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF CONSENT 
GIVEN BY APPELLANT TO ENTER HER PREMISES FOR 
EXPRESS PURPOSES AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM 
THE SEARCH WHICH EXCEEDED THOSE PURPOSES 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. 
The law enforcement agents were allowed to enter 
the home of Marcella Griffin, appellant, to take care of the 
children, and to check to see if the suspects were in the home. 
After they had performed the function for which they had been 
given permission, they remained on the premises with the express 
intention of waiting for the arrival of the co-defendants, 
Dennis Griffin and Shawn Henline. The officers arrested the 
co-defendants and seized a duffle bag at the home of appellant. 
-3-
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The motion to suppress the duffle bag was denied and that 
evidence was used to convict appellant. It is the 
contention of the appellant that the actions of the law 
enforcement agents exceeded their authority and was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures, 
together with the federal exclusionary doctrine, is obligatory 
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). The Fourth Amendment 
requires the issuance of a warrant based upon probable cause 
before a search may be conducted. However, there are 
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. 
A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutiona: 
permissible and is an established exception to the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 1973, 412 U.S. 
218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854; State v. White, 577 P.2d 
552, (Utah, 1978). However, the practice of substituting 
consent for the authorization of a serach warrant is not viewec 
favorably by the courts, United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.Lc 
126, 129 (7th Cir., 1971), particularly where no reason is 
shown why a search warrant was not obtained. United State~ 
Arrington, 215 F.2d 630, 637 (7th Cir., 1954). See also 
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Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264, 268 (1953), 
where the Sixth Circuit Court expressed a similar sentiment. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "police 
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval 
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 
889 (1968). The Tenth Circuit Court, in setting out the 
specifics necessary to sustain the Government's burden to 
establish justification for a warrantless search based on 
consent, stated that "the courts will indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights", and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. Villano v. United States, 
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir., 1962). 
Thus, the Statehas the burden of showing that the 
accused's rights were not violated by reason of an improper 
search. This extends not only to the validity of the consent 
but to the scope of the sonsent as well. Appellant contends 
that police officers exceeded the scope of the consent given 
them to search her residence, and the State has failed to 
sustain the burden that it acted within the scope of consent. 
The Tenth Circuit Court applied the Villano criteria in 
United States v. Abbot, 546 F.2d 863 (1977), to determine that 
the government failed to show that they had not improperly 
searched beyond the scope of the consent given by the accused's 
wife. The defendant's conviction was reversed with directions 
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to sustain the motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit 
has also stated the rule that the government has the burden 
of showing that it acted within the scope of defendant's 
consent in United States v. Dichiarinte, 1 supra, a eading 
case on consent searches. Accord, State v. Koucoules, 343 
A.2d 860 (Mo., 1974). 
The rule regarding the scope of consent searches 
is stated generally: 
When the police are relying upon consent 
as the basis for their warrantless search 
they have no more authority than they hav~ 
been given by the consent. It is thus 
important to take account of any express 
or implied limitations or qualifications 
attendin that consent which establishes 
t e permissi e scope o the search in 
terms of such matters as time, duration, 
area, or intensity. Lafave, Search and 
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment (1978) Vol. 2, §8.1 Consent 
Searches, p. 624. (Emphasis Supplied) 
. Though consent can legitimize what would be an otherwise illega: 
and unreasonable search, the search is reasonable only to the 
extent that the accused has consented. This rule is recognized 
and applied in three of the leading consent search cases. 
In McNear v. Rhay, 398 P.2d 732 (Wash., 1965), it was held 
that a search which exceeds the scope of the consent is 
unreasonable and in violation of defendant's constitutional 
rights. The Court determined that the evidence procurred as 
a result of the unreasonable search should be suppressed. 
defendant in McNear was arrested for shoplifting. After 
The 
he was booked, he was asked to sign a consent form which, in 
broad terms, granted to the police the authorization to search 
-6-
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his apartment for stolen goods. They discovered no stolen 
goods, but did discover a marijuana cigarette. Officers 
from the narcotics squad arrived shortly thereafter, and 
after confirming the content of the cigarette as marijuana, 
a search for additional narcotics began. The Court, in 
determining that the search for narcotics was unreasonable 
because it was beyond the scope of consent, stated: 
In this respect, the testimony is undisputed 
that the official request for the consent 
to search was predicated solely upon a belief 
that stolen property, in the nature of 
"shoplifted" articles, would be found. 
Petitioner was so informed by a member of the 
larceny detail and signed the consent with 
that understanding. Under such circumstances, 
the consent to search, which under any 
circumstances amounts to no more than a 
waiver of a search warrant, was limited in 
its scope, despite the all-encompassing 
language thereof. It would not and could 
not su ort a eneral ex lorator search 
or seizure. aron, Searc es 2 Seizures-.and IImllunities, Ch. IV, §3(c), p. 31, 398 P.Zd at 
738. (Emphasis Supplied) 
The scope of a consent search is limited much like a search 
warrant is limited. Police officers are only allowed to 
search for those items listed in the warrant. In the case of 
a consent search, where the request for consent is predicated 
on the search of specific items, the police officers are not 
authorized to search further and conduct a "general exploratory 
search." The Seventh Circuit Court, in United States v. 
Dichiarinte, supra, has also noted the parallel between a 
search warrant and a consent se·arch in terms of the limitations 
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imposed on both: 
A defendant's consent may limit the 
extent or scope of a warrantless search 
in the same way that the specifications 
of a warrant limit a search pursuant to 
that warrant. 445 F.2d at 129. 
Additionally, the Court continued: 
Our holding that the search was 
unreasonable because it went beyond the 
scope of defendant's consent would be the 
same if the agents had conducted the 
search under a search warrant. 
445 F. 2d at 130. 
The Court in State v. Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860 
(Mo., 1974), determined from defendant's words and actions 
that she placed no limitations on her consent to search and 
the search that followed was well within the broad scope 
of consent which defendant impliedly defined. In that case, 
defendant called police officers to her home where they 
discovered her husband's body with a bullet wound in the head. 
Officers asekd defendant's permission to search the home and 
she consented. Defendant was not a suspect at the time, and 
hence imposed no limitations on the search. In fact, she left 
with friends while the police officers were searching, a fact 
the Court read as her indifference to the presence of the polic< 
in her home. In view of her indifference, the Court concluded 
her consent was broad and unlimited. The Court noted, citing 
several cases, the rule that "the scope of a consent search 
is limited by the bounds, and determined by the breadth, 
of actual consent itself." General and broad consent has been 
-8-
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found to exist when defendant, in response to a request 
by police to simply search, gives authorization to "look 
around". Lamb v. State, 516 P. 2d 1405 (Nev., 1973), 
"go ahead and find it" (stolen property), State v. Rye, 
471 P.2d 96 (Wash., 1970), or "be my guest", State v. 
Johnson, 427 P.2d 705 (Wash, 1967). Note, however, that 
is all these cases, the police officers made no representations 
about the specific objects or purpose of their search. 
Ordinarily, a limitation is not expressly stated by the 
consenting party. Rather it arises by implication from the 
fact that the consent is being sought for a particular 
purpose. The Courts will look at the facts and circumstances 
to determine if they give rise to a limit by implication. 
McNear v. Ray, supra, State v. Koucoules, supra. When a 
purpose is included in the request, then the consent must 
be construed as authorizing only the intensity of police 
activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose. In 
United States v. Dichiarinte, supra, the Court so held, 
stating: 
The evidence at the suppression hearings 
contains repeated reference to the agents 
interest in narcotics; and there was no 
indication that they desired to look for 
anything other than narcotics themselves . 
Under these circumstances, defendant's 
statement that the agents could "come over 
to the house and look"must be taken to mean 
at most that they might come and conduct 
only such a search as would be necessa:y 
to establish whether he had any narcotics. 
Government a ents ma not obtain consent 
resentation t at t e 
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items and subsequently, use that consent 
as a license to conduct a general exploratory 
search. -
445 F.2d at 129 (Emphasis Supplied) 
The effect of this is that the police officer himself may 
limit the scope of the search and the defendant consents 
only to the extent that the police officer has indicated 
in his request. In Dichiarinte, the defendant consented 
to a search of his home in response to a police inquiry 
whether he had any narcotics. The police, in the course of 
their search, opened and read incriminating documents which 
led to defendant's conviction for income tax evasion. The 
Seventh Circuit Court held that the evidence should have be~ 
suppressed. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in United States v. Abbott, 
supra, viewed the surrounding facts and circumstances to find 
an implied limitation on defendant's wife's consent to search. 
As stated above, defendant does not ordinarily expressly 
limit his consent, however,the facts and circumstances must 
be viewed to determine whether a limitation has arisen by 
implication. 
Applying the preceding case law to the facts of the 
instant case, the appellant contends first, that assuming that 
the consent was valid, it was nonetheless limited. The 
limitation on the scope of the consent search arose by 
implication. The officer asked if the police officers could 
enter the Griffin home for two distinct purposes, and Mrs. 
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Griffin, the appellant, answered in the affirmative. The 
police officer himself limited the scope when she asked 
for permission to enter her home. Police Officer Carl 
Voyles, Salt Lake City, Police Department, testified: 
A. At this time [after Ms. Griffin's arrest 
just outside her home] I was informed that 
there was a problem of children in the home 
these children being hers. And I asked ' 
her at this time if we could go to her home, 
obtain the children for safekeeping, and also, 
make a search for the suspects in the 
situation. 
Q. What was her response? 
A. She indicated, yes. (T. 846). 
The officer asked for entry into the home for two express 
purposes. First, to remove the children from the home for 
safekeeping and second, as Police Officer Voyles stated on 
direct examination "to see if the suspect Henline was still 
in the house and to make the area safe." (T. 851). Appellant 
consented to an entry into the privacy of her home for those 
two purposes. Once those purposes were accomplished, the 
police officers had no further authorization to search. 
Consequently, their subsequent seizure of the duffle bag was 
unreasonable and the trial court should not have denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. (T. 865). 
The case law requires that the surrounding facts 
and circumstances be viewed to determine if there is in fact, 
a limit on the scope of the consent search. In addition to 
Police Officer Voyles limiting the scope of search in his 
request, there is also the fact that appellant, once arrested, 
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was concerned with the welfare of her children. Thus, when 
asked if the children could be removed she would of co 
' ' urse, 
consent to that. The record shows that appellant herself 
understood her consent as limited for purpose of entering 
the home to get her children (T. 835). But even assuming 
that the officer also requested to search for the suspects 
and make the area safe, the co-defendant probably, and 
reasonably, concluded that when the officers entered the home 
for the children, they might look for the suspects as well, 
since they were already on the premises and could not ignore 
them once they were there. Appellant consented then to a 
single entry on the premises for those two purposes. She 
was arrested and being taken to jail, therefore, it is unlikely 
that she was indifferent or consenting to the police officers' 
extended stay on her premises. The police officer's took 
the appellant's lililited consent and used it as a license to 
conduct what amounts to a surveillance and a general explorator:: 
search. Police officer Voyles limited the scope of the 
consent search (T.846, 858). He admitted that a search 
for evidence of the robbery or any other search except that 
directed to determine if the suspects were in the home was 
a "different thing". Voyles also testified that they did 
not have permission to search the home for items as evidence 
of robbery. (T. 848-850). Officer Kenneth L. Thirsk, of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department, later testified that he 
arrived at the premises after it had already been entered 
and that he then made the decision to remain on the premises 
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(T. 858). He also testified that Detective Darrell M. 
Ondrak did not inform him of the limited permission to 
enter the home (which police officers Voyles had previously 
obtained from Ms. Griffin) (T. 850). Thirsk also 
testified that they waited an hour and a half for the suspects 
to return (T. 860). In other words, they were no longer 
searching for the purposes for which consent was given. 
That search had ended once it was determined that the suspects 
were not in the home. The police officers continued presence 
on the premises and subsequent seizure of the duffle bag were 
actions beyond the actual consent given. Thirsk also 
testified that he directed Officer Voyles to go to the jail 
and obtain a written consent from appellant. Thirsk interpreted 
that request for written consent as a "verification" of 
the previous oral consent (T. 861). Yet Officer Voyles, 
the police officer who obtained and limited the consent to 
enter the premises interpreted the request for a written consent 
as a request to search the appellant's home - a search that 
had not been previously consented to (T. 850, 851). One 
officer received limited consent while another officer interpreted 
that consent to allow a general.exploratory search. Then 
the State contends that the officers wanted to verify that 
search in writing when, in viewing the inconsistent testimony 
of the officers, they were, in fact, seeking a consent for 
a search already conducted, but in excess of the consent given. 
The rule of law is that the State must carry the 
burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the 
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search and seizure of evidence does not exceed the scope 
of consent. Appellant contends that the State has not met 
this burden. The State has offered the testimony of two 
officers which is conflicting in terms of what the scope 
of consent was. The subsequent interpretation of the consent 
obtained is not controlling, however. What is controlling 
is the representation made by the officer requesting the seu~ 
and the appellant's consent to that limited search. The 
officers admittedly remained on the premises after the 
search was made therefore, beyond the scope of the consent. 
The seizure of the duffle bag during the time the officers 
were illegally on the premises was unreasonable and should 
not have been allowed into evidence in violation of the 
appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
The trial judge concluded that the motion to 
suppress should be denied because the seizure of the duffle 
bag was incident to arrest of Shawn Henline and Dennis Griffin. 
co-defendants in this case. The judge, however, failed to 
address the question of the scope of consent. As appellant 
contends above, since the scope of the consent was exceeded, 
any seizure after that was unreasonable and the evidence 
procurred from the illegal presence on the premises is 
"tainted" with illegality and hence should not be admissible. 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (19ZO); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). A subsequent 
-14-
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arrest should not be used to try to validate the seizure 
that was initially illegal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out in the petition above, 
the appellant asserts that the conviction should be reversed, 
or in the alternative, the appellant should be granted a 
new trial. 
-15-
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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